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CASENOTES
SECURITIES LAW-RULE 10b-5-Compliance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles Will Not Insulate Accountants
from Civil Liability for Fraud. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1194,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Section 10(b) 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-52
promulgated thereunder protect investors against fraudulent or misleading
practices employed by any person "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." The rule has traditionally given rise ,to civil actions against
corporations, insiders, and broker-dealers.3  Since the late 1960's however,
rule lob-5 has been expanded to proscribe the misleading conduct of ac-
countants as well. 4 Recently, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath5 that an accountant was liable under rule 10b-5 for issuing false
and misleading financial statements despite compliance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. The district court's decision is significant in its
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
3. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (insider); Hooper v.
Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) (corporation); Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (broker-dealer). Aiders and abettors of par-
ties belonging to these categories have also been held liable under Rule 10b-5. See,
e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966);
Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
4. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(corporation's auditor held liable for false statements and material omissions in prospec-
tus contained in registration statement); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (accountants liable for failure to disclose after-acquired information that corpora-
tion's financial statement, which accountants had certified, was false). It is arguable
that accountants' liability under rule 10b-5 is merely one aspect of the overall trend
toward imposing liability under the securities laws upon all parties involved in securities
transactions. See, e.g., Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Law-
yers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974).
5. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574, at 95,993 (S.D.
N.Y. 1974).
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rejection of generally accepted accounting principles as the standard of fair
and adequate disclosure, and concomitantly, for its extension of the para-
meters of accountants' liability.
Plaintiff Herzfeld, an investor, alleged that Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath (Laventhol) prepared an audited report of Firestone Group Lim-
ited (FGL)6 which was materially misleading. The audit was distributed
to investors in connection with a 1969 private offering of FGL securities.
The plaintiff had purchased two units of securities prior to the issuance of
the Laventhol audited report. 7 As a result of this audit, FGL offered to re-
fund the payments of those investors who had already purchased in the priv-
ate offering. 8 Herzfeld contended that he relied on the Laventhol audit in
deciding to decline the refund and retain his securities. Specifically, the
plaintiff objected to Laventhol's inclusion in the financial statement of in-
come from certain real estate transactions, 9 which transformed FGL's sub-
stantial losses into a sizabe profit for the year 1969.10 Plaintiff contended
that these transactions were a sham, initiated solely to induce investment in
the private offering. In fact, the real estate transactions were never consum-
mated, 1 and when FGL petitioned for bankruptcy the value of plaintiff's
securities fell from $510,000 to $55,000.
The district court rejected plaintiff's contentions that the transactions in
question were phony, or that they involved mere options to buy, finding in-
stead that they constituted valid contracts. 12  On the other hand, the court
concluded that Laventhol's report was materially misleading because the ac-
countants failed to reveal adequately their reservations concerning FGL's
ability to collect the balance receivable on the contract of sale.' 3 The court
6. FGL is a Delaware corporation engaged in real estate syndication which con-
ducts its business primarily in California.
7. Herzfeld purchased one unit on his own and one in a partnership with his brother
under the auspices of General Investors Co., added as a party plaintiff during trial.
8. FGL tendered this offer because investors had been led by the note and stock
purchase agreement to expect a net of $315,000 for the company, rather than the audited
net of $66,000.
9. These transactions involved the purchase and immediate resale by FGL of nurs-
ing home properties less than one month before the private offering was conducted.
10. The court found that "whether FGL appeared to be a profitable or unprofitable
company . . . depended on the recognition of the sales proceeds and the profit from
the [nursing home] transaction in the company's financial statements." [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574, at 95,996.
11. Of the $2 million expected profit, plaintiff received one $25,000 down payment.
12. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574, at 95,999-96,000.
The court stated: "We think the contracts, as a whole, are open to several interpreta-
tions, and the interpretation adopted by Laventhol was supportable."
13. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574, at 96,000.
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was not persuaded by Laventhol's contention that their compliance with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles 14 constituted full and adequate disclos-
ure which insulated them from liability for fraud. "Fair disclosure," not
compliance with accepted accounting principles, was -the standard demanded
by the district court. The court classified the action as one involving mis-
representation in which proof of reliance must be established, 15 and conceded
that plaintiff had not relied on the audit in making his original purhase.' 6
Nevertheless, the court found that a true statement of FGL's financial con-
dition might have caused the plaintiff to change his investment decision and
demand a refund of his payments.' 7 Following a determination that this
constituted substantial reliance, liability was imposed under rule 10b-5, the
New York General Business Law,' 8 and common law fraud.
This note will concern itself with the demise of generally accepted
accounting principles as a standard of professional due care and with the
district court's conclusion that the plaintiff relied on Laventhol's audited re-
port.
I. GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AS A
lOb-5 STANDARD OF CONDUCT
The elements of a statutory action brought under rule 10b-5 are derived
largely from the common law concept of fraud. 19 In his Herzfeld opinion,
Judge MacMahon cited20 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.21 as having enu-
14. Laventhol qualified the report as "subject to the collectibility of the balance re-
ceivable on the contract of sale." They also added to the report note 4, which stated
the financial terms of the nursing home transaction contracts. Note 4 also described
the treatment of the profit from the transactions and the liquidated damages provision.
Laventhol contended that this constituted full and adequate disclosure in compliance
with generally accepted accounting principles. Id.
15. Id. at 96,003.
16. Id. at 96,003-04. Herzfeld's interest in the securities was stirred by a partner
in the underwriting firm for FGL's private offering, Allen & Company Incorporated,
and by a business-broker acquaintance.
17. Id. at 96,004.
18. N.Y. GEN. Bus. Law § 352-c (McKinney 1968).
19. The common law elements of fraud are: false representation of a material fact;
knowledge by the defendant that his representation is false; intent by the defendant
to deceive and induce others to rely on his representation; reliance by plaintiffs; and
damage suffered as a result of such reliance. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). See also Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N.Y. 170 (1931).
20. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574, at 95,998.
21. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Texas
Gulf Sulphur case expanded the concept of insiders to include anyone in possession
of material inside information and not merely officers or directors of a corporation,
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merated the elements of proof required by the Second Circuit to establish
a rule 1Ob-5 claim: the defendant's representation was materially mislead-
ing; the defendant knew the representation was misleading;22 the plaintiff re-
lied on the representation; and the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of
such reliance. Missing from the formula was the common law concept of
intent to deceive,23 proof of which the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur found
as had previously been the case. The court of appeals found the corporation and several
of its officers, directors, and employees liable under rule lob-5 for taking advantage
of their exclusive knowledge of material inside information concerning a possible ore
discovery by purchasing company stock in national exchange transactions before the
information became public. The court imposed an affirmative duty of disclosure upon
the defendant insiders to reveal their information to the shareholders from whom they
sought to purchase stock. The application of the affirmative duty of disclosure rule
to stock exchange transactions was a novel one; courts had previously required disclosure
only in face-to-face negotiations. For a more complete and thorough discussion of this
case, see Sandier & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities Market Place,
30 OHIo S.L.J. 225 (1969). For the view that the court of appeals decision was an
unfortunate one, see Leavell, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Opinion in the Appellate Court:
An Open Door to Federal Control of Corporations, 3 GA. L. REv. 141 (1968).
22. Actually, the majority opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur, authored by Judge Water-
man, shed doubt as to whether proof of knowledge on the part of a defendant of the
misleading nature of his action, that is, scienter, was required by the Second Circuit in
rule 10b-5 damage claims. This uncertainty resulted from Judge Waterman's classifica-
tion of the defendants' activities as negligence, despite the presence of undisputed knowl-
edge, see 401 F.2d at 852-53, on their part. While Texas Gulf Sulphur involved an
action by the SEC for injunctive relief and was not a private action for damages, Judge
Waterman also indicated approval of a negligence standard in private damage claims
brought under rule lob-5. Thus, despite the presence of scienter in Texas Gulf Sul-
phur, Judge Waterman's discussion raised serious doubts as to whether the Second Cir-
cuit would consider it a necessary element of proof in future rule lOb-5 actions. In
a separate concurrence Judge Friendly, joined by Judges Kaufman and Anderson, took
specific exception to Judge Waterman's apparent abandonment of the scienter require-
ment. This internal conflict among the judges led at least one lower court to categorize
the Second Circuit's scienter stance as "an open question." Marx & Co. v. Diner's
Club, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,881 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The confusion was subsequently eliminated by -the Second Circuit in Shemtob v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971), a private damage action in which
the court explicitly held that knowledge, or scienter, was an essential element of rule
10b-5 claims, and concomitantly, that mere negligent conduct by a defendant would not
be sufficient to justify application of rule lob-5. In so stating, the court cited Judge
Friendly's concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur while ignoring the majority opin-
ion. See id. at 445.
23. Common law intent to deceive involves several factors, not all of which have
been deemed unnecessary to prove in rule lob-5 actions. These factors include actual
knowledge, that is, scienter; intent to make a misleading statement; and intent that the
misleading statement be related to certain persons who will act upon it. See W. PRossER,
supra note 19, at 700. The scienter aspect of intent to deceive is separable from the
aspects involving specific intent to mislead. Scienter involves actual knowledge of false-
hood or reckless disregard for the truth, as opposed to mere negligence, which involves
conduct which is not wholly innocent but may be excusable. Such actual or constructive
knowledge remains a required element of proof in Second Circuit rule 10b-5 claims.
,[Vol. 24:343
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unnecessary in determining whether rule 10b-5 had been violated. Several
circuits have expressed a similar conviction with regard to the scienter re-
quirement; the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the defendant knew the
particular representation was misleading.24 Still further erosion of the strict
common law fraud concept occurred in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States,25 where the United States Supreme Court dispensed with the reliance
requirement in actions involving total nondisclosure.
Absent indications to the contrary, however, it is apparent that the Affil-
iated Ute view of reliance does not extend beyond actions involving total non-
disclosure. Thus, with the exception of those circuits that have abolished
the scienter requirement, 26 the Texas Gulf Sulphur formula enunciates the
guiding criteria in rule 1Ob-5 claims for misrepresentation. A plaintiff must,
as a result, establish material misrepresentation, which the defendant knew
was false, reliance, and consequential damages.
While courts have more precisely defined the elements of proof required
in a rule lOb-5 action, the standard of care an accountant must satisfy re-
mains subject to dispute. Accountants themselves have traditionally looked
to the usual practices of their profession-the generally accepted accounting
principles-in order to protect themselves from possible liability. For ex-
Proof of intention to mislead, however, has been almost universally eliminated as a re-
quirement in rule lOb-5 actions. Consequently, elimination of intent to deceive as a
requirement of proof does not involve abolition of the scienter requirement as well. See
Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 573 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1970) (liability imposed on defendants under section 10b of the act when they
purchased stock from plaintiffs without informing them of company's optimistic future
prospects); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) (defendants held liable
under rule lob-5 for untrue statements and omission of material facts made while so-
liciting purchase of stock in corporation yet to be formed); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 19 61) (defendant held liable under rule 10b-5 for fraud in connection
with joint venture by stockholders to acquire control of corporation).
It must be noted, however, that elimination of the scienter requirement by the above
courts has been limited to rule 10b-5 actions for injunctive relief; courts have apparently
been unwilling to impose liability on defendants in damage actions where mere negli-
gence was involved, without proof that defendant knew his representations were false,
either actually or constructively. See Bucklo, supra note 23, at 563.
25. 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (defendants induced holders of corporation's stock
to dispose of their shares without informing shareholders of great demand for their
stock, which defendants themselves had largely created). The rationale behind the Su-
preme Court's abolition of the reliance requirement in actions involving total nondis-
closure was to avoid situations where a defendant escapes liability because of the diffi-
culty involved in proving reliance on an omission. To ease the burden in such a situa-
tion the Court required the plaintiff to prove only that the facts withheld were material
insofar as a reasonable investor might have found them important in making his in-
vestment decision. id. at 153-54.
26. See note 24 supra.
1975]
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ample, accountants typically "qualify" their opinion of a company's financial
condition when they are uncertain of the validity of figures represented in
the company's financial statements. Essentially, this procedure is utilized to
notify anyone relying on the financial statements that the accountants cannot
guarantee the accuracy of the figures represented and, in fact, that they have
reservations about the accuracy of these representations. The question of
whether compliance with such a procedure will constitute fair and adequate
disclosure has prompted differing reactions from the courts.
Several judicial decisions follow the practice of the industry itself and have
adopted the view that compliance with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples will insulate accountants from civil liability for fraud. In Shahmoon
v. General Development Corp.,27 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that since certain practices employed by
the defendants were endorsed by the accounting profession, the plaintiff's
contention of fraud could not stand. Similarly, in Escott v. BarChris Con-
struction Corp.,28 the same court stated conclusively that "[a]ccountants
should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profes-
sion.' '29 In yet another case, Donovan Construction Co. v. Woosley, 30 the
sole issue for the court's determination was whether generally accepted ac-
counting principles had been satisfied. The finding that normal accounting
practices were adhered to was held to refute the plaintiff's assertion of fraud.
On the other hand, at least one court has stated that compliance with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles is not an absolute defense against liabil-
ity in civil actions. In Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v.
Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs,8 ' the Fourth Circuit declared that gen-
27. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,308, at 95,035
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Among other things, the accountants in Shahmoon made it a practice
to record the development company's sale of a homesite as completed after the first
monthly payments. Id. at 95,039. Since that and other procedures objected to by the
plaintiff were normal practices of the accounting profession, the court was unwilling to
sustain the allegations of fraud.
28. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see note 4 supra. The court in BarChris
found that the exent of the accountants' investigation into the company's financial condi-
tion for purposes of preparing an S-I review did not satisfy generally accepted account-
ing standards; thus, liability was imposed.
29. Id. at 703.
30. 358 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Ark. 1973). The court found that by personally viewing
certificates of deposit which were included in the company's financial statements as cur-
rent assets and by using other audit procedures to verify the existence of valuations
placed on the certificates of deposit, the accountants satisfied the requirements of their
profession and were free from liability.
31. 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972). Accountants were held negligent for their failure
to conduct any independent investigation into the existence or nonexistence of leasehold
.[Vol. 24:343
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erally accepted accounting principles were a minimum standard which ac-
countants must satisfy to avoid liability, and that compliance with industry
standards would not bar liability in all situations.3 2
A more radical departure came in United States v. Simon,"3 a criminal
case in which the Second Circuit rejected as inconclusive expert testimony
that the defendants had complied with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. The court was concerned more with whether the accountants had
made a fair presentation of the company's financial statements than with
their adherence to accepted accounting standards. The Simon decision may
be subject to alternate interpretations: first, that generally accepted account-
ing principles in and of themselves will not serve as a defense to a lawsuit;
second, that compliance with the usual practices of the profession will serve
as a complete defense in those situations where an official pronouncement
of the accounting profession is at issue. The generally accepted accounting
principles disputed in Simon were recognized as being extensively used, but
they had not been expressly set out in an official pronouncement. Thus,
compliance with them failed to insulate the defendants from criminal culpa-
bility. 34
These conflicting decisions have not clarified the legal significance of gen-
erally accepted accounting principles. Shahmoon, BarChris, and Donovan at
least facially stand for the proposition that adherence to industry standards
would render accountants free from liability in civil actions for fraud. On
the other hand, Rhode Island Hospital Trust held that generally accepted
accounting principles were a minimum standard by which to measure liability
improvements listed on a company's financial statements as substantial business costs.
On rehearing, 482 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1973), the court of appeals found that the plain-
tiff bank relied on the negligently prepared financial statements in extending loans to
the audited company by virtue of which the bank incurred losses.
32. 455 F.2d at 852.
33. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). Evidence indi-
cating that the accountant-defendants knew of looting by the corporate president, certi-
fied as an asset a receivable whose collectibility was essential but collateralized by se-
curities of the same corporation whose solvency was in question, and failed to reveal
a known increase in the receivable, was sufficient to sustain a finding of criminal
intent to draw up and certify a false and misleading financial statement.
34. While it is far from the predominant view, the latter interpretation is derived
from Judge Friendly's statement that the expert testimony on compliance with generally
accepted accounting principles should not be a complete defense for defendants, "at least
not when the accountants' testimony was not based on specific rules or prohibitions to
which they could point." Id. at 806. The witnesses in Simon testified on the need for
an auditor to make an honest judgment, and they expressed their belief that nothing
contained in the financial statements negated the conclusion that an honest judgment had
been made. Obviously, this testimony was not specific enough to satisfy the
court.
1975]
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in civil actions for fraud. And in Simon, reliance on industry standards was
apparently rejected altogether as a defense to criminal liability. Viewed
together, these cases well illustrate the inconsistent treatment which generally
accepted accounting principles have received from the courts.
II. THE HERZFELD CASE
The issue of the legal significance of the accounting industry's standards
was squarely presented for the district court's consideration in Herzfeld. In
determining whether the defendant's audited report was materially mislead-
ing, the court inquired into the correct procedure for an accountant to follow
while recording real estate transactions. As a consequence, the question be-
came whether Laventhol could be held liable for fraudulent conduct despite
adherence to accounting procedures recognized and endorsed by the profes-
sion.35 Judge MacMahon stated that it was incumbent on Laventhol to fully
reveal to investors its reservations concerning the real estate transactions and
the information on which those reservations were founded. 83 Although Lav-
enthol insisted, despite threats of suit from FGL and the underwriters, 7 on
listing only a relatively small portion of the $2 million profit from the trans-
action as current income,38 and although they qualified their opinion, stating
that the report was "subject to collectibility of the balance receivable on the
contract of sale,"139 the court found that their disclosure was inadequate due
to the absence of certain facts essential for an informed investment decision.
35. Laventhol's defense of compliance with generally accepted accounting principles
was summarily rejected. The court was concerned not with "whether Laventhol's report
satisfie[d] esoteric accounting norms, comprehensible only to the initiate, but [rather
with] whether the report fairly present[ed] the true financial position of Firestone ...
to the untutored eye of the ordinary investor." [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED, SEc. L. REP. 94,574, at 95,998.
36. Of particular significance to the investor was such information as the fact that
the buyer's net worth was only $100,000; that some ambiguities existed in the contract
language to suggest to some that they resembled options to buy; that the transaction
was the largest in which FGL had ever participated; and that if the income from the
transactions was not realized, FGL would show a loss for the year 1969. Id. at
96,001-02. The court cited an article by a member of the SEC's legal staff in support
of it's contentions: Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws--Some Observations, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1973).
37. Allen & Company Associates Incorporated assisted FGL in the private placement
of securities. Laventhol impleaded Allen & Company as a third party defendant. Both
FGL and Allen & Company had threatened to sue Laventhol if the conservative audit
jeopardized the success of the private offering. See [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. % 94,574, at 95,998.
38. This current income included two $25,000 cash payments from the purchaser
and $185,000 in liquidated damages payable under the contract should the purchaser
fail to comply.
39. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,574, at 96,000.
350 f[Vol. 24:343
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Thus, Judge MacMahon placed on Laventhol the heavy burden of exposing
all the facts which an investor might need to decipher the financial state-
ments accurately. In so doing the court relied on United States v. Simon,40
thus extending that decision's holding, that generally accepted account-
ing principles will not relieve an accountant from responsibility for fraud, to
civil as well as criminal cases.
In order for the court to impose liability on the accountants for their mis-
leading report, the plaintiff had to prove that he had relied on the audit in
making his unfortunate investment. Perhaps in anticipation of problems of
proof, the plaintiff attempted to invoke the Affiliated Ute rule which abol-
ished the reliance requirement in cases involving total nondisclosure. Judge
MacMahon, however, believed that the conduct before him was merely that
of affirmative misrepresentation, upon which reliance must be demonstra-
ted.41
The plaintiff's initial interest in the securities was generated by sources
other than the defendant. 42 In fact, both of his units were purchased prior
to the issuance of the Laventhol audit. Herzfeld admitted that even when
he received the audit, accompanied by FGL's offer to refund, he read only
the income statement and the FGL letter. Laventhol contended in court that
this negated any possibility of reliance, since the essential qualification and
explanatory note were ignored. Judge MacMahon disagreed, finding that
the income statement supported Herzfeld's impression that FGL was a profit-
able business. The court felt that a true version of the company's finances
would have altered the plaintiff's positive impression of the company and as
a result may have convinced him to terminate his investment. Consequently,
the court concluded that the picture the report painted of FGL's financial
condition was "a substantial, even crucial, factor" 43 in causing Herzfeld's los-
ses.
CONCLUSION
It can be argued that the court's position is a tenuous one. It is clear
that Herzfeld did not rely on Laventhol in undertaking his original invest-
ment. Only by virtue of FGL's refund offer did any possibility of reliance
arise, and then only to the extent that the plaintiff might have depended on
40. 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); see note 33
supra.
41. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 94,574, at 96,003.
42. See note 16 supra.
43. According to Prosser, for reliance to be found, "[ilt is enough that the misrepre-
sentation has had a material influence on the Plaintiff's conduct, and been a substantial
factor in bringing about his action." W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 715,
1975]
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the audited report in deciding whether to rescind his purchase. If Herzfeld
had read the entire report and then made his decision to retain the securities,
a finding of reliance would be defensible. Absent this, the court's conclusion
that reliance was established seems dubious.
Problems arise as well with the court's rejection of generally accepted ac-
counting principles as establishing a standard of fair and adequate disclosure.
While at first glance the Herzfeld decision appears to be an innovative at-
tempt to protect investors against fraudulent inducement, the case's broad im-
plications warrant closer inspection. If generally accepted accounting princi-
ples no longer afford protection from liability, the role of an accountant may
change radically. To avoid liability, the auditor may become merely a re-
porter, disclosing endless amounts of information, tending to confuse investors
rather than advise them. Accountants may be sued each time an investment
fails for not revealing facts which subsequently become known. They may
be held liable for the transgressions of corporate management solely because
they provide an easier target; and survival may dictate that they assume re-
sponsibilities properly belonging to issuers and underwriters."4
Undoubtedly, accountants must make their accepted practices conform to
higher levels of judicial expectation. However, rejecting the standards of the
profession entirely, and replacing them with a standard as ambiguous as "fair
presentation" may only compel professional resistance to heightened responsi-
bility.
Christopher FitzPatrick
CRIMINAL LAW-Dismissal of Indictment Required in
Criminal Case Where Cessation of Criminal Justice Act
Funding Resulted in Unavailability of Competent Counsel
for Indigent Defendant. United States v. Chatman, Criminal
No. 28538-74 (D.C. Super. Ct., May 7, 1974).
The sixth amendment guarantee of "assistance of counsel" in all criminal
prosecutions has been significantly expanded in recent years. In 1963 this
right was made a due process requirement in certain state prosecutions' and
44. For a vigorous criticism of the district court's opinion, see Address by Carl D.
Liggio, California State CPA Society Annual Meeting, June 26, 1974.
1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
,[Vol. 24:352
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in 1972, the assistance of counsel guarantee was extended to any defendant
threatened with loss of liberty.2 The expansion of the right to representation
has inevitably raised questions as to how to supervise the quality of appointed
counsel. Although these issues are most frequently confronted by courts
in a post-conviction forum, the Superior Court of -the District of Columbia
dealt directly with the nature of defendants' assistance during the pre-trial
stage in United States v. Chatman.3
The case arose after funds under the Criminal Justice Act 4 for the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia were frozen. In lieu of counsel appointed
under the Act, Chatman and his co-defendant, Crawford, were each assigned
court-appointed attorneys to defend them against felony charges arising from
an alleged second degree burglary. At their arraignment, they expressed dis-
satisfaction with the performance of these counsel.
Specifically, Chatman alleged that he had seen his lawyer only once during
his three months of incarceration and that no bond review motion had been
filed despite the availability of a third-party custodian. Moreover, Craw-
ford, who was also incarcerated, had seen his lawyer only once at his
preliminary hearing. Repeated attempts to determine from his attorney the
status of grand jury action in his case had proved unsuccessful. 5
When counsel for Chatman asked to be relieved of the case, his re-
quest was granted by the court." Moreover, the court granted the defendant
Crawford's request for vacation of appointment after discovering that his law-
yer was counsel in fifty-eight active and pending cases. 7
The Public Defender Service was then requested to assume the defense
in these cases but their eleven staff lawyers, each of whom was already in-
volved in more than the thirty case recommended maximum, maintained that
acceptance of additional felony cases would be inconsistent with the require-
ments of the sixth amendment.8  Consequently, the court requested the as-
2. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
3. Criminal No. 28538-74 (D.C. Super. Ct., May 7, 1974).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
5. Criminal No. 28538-74 at 1-2.
6. Only in rare cases have trial lawyers declared their own inadequacy, particularly
when their adequacy has been challenged by neither court nor client. See Johnson v.
United States, 328 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Criminal No. 28538-74, at 6,
where the court cited a letter received from a member of the District of Columbia Bar
specializing in patent law summoned to defend an indigent defendant in an unrelated
case. The attorney commendably claimed that acceptance of the appointment would
"be in direct violation of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibilities, Canon 2(30)."
7. The felony trial caseload per attorney in the Public Defender Service for the
District of Columbia is restricted to thirty. See Memorandum of the Board of Trustees
Regarding Caseload Levels of Staff Attorneys 3 (1973).
8. Criminal No. 28538-74, at 4-5.
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signment of two lawyers qualified to litigate felony cases from a pool of mem-
bers of the District of Columbia Bar. At that time, however, none were
available to assume additional appointments. Confronted with the unavail-
ability of competent counsel, the court was unable to proceed with the ar-
raignment9 and, as a result, ordered the indictments dismissed without preju-
dice. 10
Recognizing dismissal as a severe sanction, the court justified its decision
by balancing the defendant's sixth amendment right to adequate representa-
tion with the community's interest in orderly and lawful prosecutions. Con-
cluding that the community as a whole has a vital interest in the "health and
vitality of the adversary system," the court found that the unavailability of
qualified counsel rendered the balancing process ineffectual."
The purpose of this note is to analyze what constitutes adequate "assist-
ance of counsel" under the sixth amendment, in a pre-trial setting. Addition-
ally, this note will consider the appropriate remedy a court can fashion once
it has determined that effective assistance of counsel is not available.
I. THE STANDARDS OF EFFECTIVENESS
A. Post-trial Setting
When courts have addressed the problem of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, a variety of standards have been established which place varying burdens
of proof upon a defendant. The most common, and the one which requires
a defendant to assume the heaviest burden, is the "mockery of justice" stand-
ard, where counsel's efforts must be found to be so perfunctory as to render
the trial a farce. 12  Frequently, courts require appellants to show not only
that they were denied the right to effective counsel but also that such denial
was prejudicial.' 8 In Scott v. United States' 4 the District of Columbia Court
9. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 & n.4 (1961), where the Court held
arraignment to be a "critical stage" in the prosecution requiring the presence of counsel.
10. The government argued an indefinite postponement until funds were available
was the proper remedy. The court, in rejecting this argument, stated that such a course
would have the effect of leaving defendants in limbo. Criminal No. 28538-74, at 6.
Cf. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1968); see note 24 inIra.
11. Criminal No. 28538-74, at 8.
12. See Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REy. 1077 (1973).
The author discusses in detail many of the standards customarily used to measure coun-
sel's performance.
13. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26
(1973). Chief Judge Bazelon argues that this proof of prejudice must overcome a well
established presumption of regularity that as long as the defendant's lawyer was present,
there was an adequate defense.
14. 259 A.2d 353 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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of Appeals required the defendant to show that counsel's "gross incompetence
blotted out the essence of a substantial defense." 15 In Dillane v. United
States,16 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit required the defendant to show an "extraordinary inattention" on the
part of his lawyer to his interests to warrant a finding of ineffective counsel. 17
The practical effect of these standards is to minimize a defendant's chances
of successfully raising the issue of the quality of his attorney's representation.
Consequently, a few courts have attempted to devise standards placing a less
onerous burden on the defendant. For example, the Third Circuit, in Moore
v. United States,15 adopted a standard of adequate performance on the part
of an attorney, which is common to other professions, requiring the defendant
to show only that his counsel did not "exercise . . .the customary skill and
knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place."' 19 This "com-
munity standards" test has been analogized to the law of torts in that it recog-
nizes a duty of care without the requirement of proven damage. 20
In the Fourth Circuit, a defendant may challenge his legal representation
by showing that his counsel did not meet with him as early and often as re-
quired, advise him of his rights, ascertain all available defenses, develop
those which are appropriate, conduct all necessary investigations and allow
enough time for reflection and preparation. 21  It has been suggested by
another court that requiring less of counsel would "convert the appointment
of counsel into a sham" and be merely a pro forma compliance with the Con-
stitution's sixth amendment guarantee.22
While these standards28 for determining whether counsel was ineffective
15. Bazelon, supra note 13, at 29. This is the test applied by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which, Bazelon argues, is still
too vague and places a heavy burden of proof upon a defendant.
16. 350 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The court of appeals upheld the denial
of the defendant's petition to appeal, without prejudice to his filing a motion under the
post-conviction relief statute.
17. Id. at 733.
18. 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
19. Id. at 736.
20. See Bazelon, supra note 13, at 31, for a discussion of the Third Circuit's ap-
proach.
21. See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968).
22. United States v. Products Marketing, 281 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Del. 1968), quot-
ing Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
23. In the same vein, one author has suggested another, more lenient test: "The test
of effective assistance of counsel should be whether counsel exhibited the normal and
customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are fairly skilled in the criminal
law and who have a fair amount of experience at the criminal bar." Finer, supra note
12, at 1080. The author would apply this test to actions or omissions of counsel by
inquiring whether counsel's behavior "was such that reasonably competent and fairly
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may ease the burden of proof, problems still exist for defendants when this
issue is raised after a full trial. The possibility that dismissal may be war-
ranted because of ineffective counsel does not remedy the fact that the de-
fendant may have been subjected to "undue and oppressive incarceration
prior to trial, and anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation. '24
Additionally, the government and the courts will have expended valuable
time, money and personnel during the course of a trial, the outcome of which
may be overturned. Thus, even if applied in a post-trial setting, use of these
standards provides no assurance that defendants' rights will be vindicated.
B. Pre-trial Standing
In spite of the fact that courts generally appear reluctant to apply the pre-
vailing standards of effective representation within their jurisdictions in a pre-
trial setting, 25 a few courts have recognized sub-standard assistance of counsel
at this early stage. In United States v. Germany,26 denial of counsel within
the meaning of the sixth amendment was found at the pre-trial stage. In
this case, the government refused to reimburse court-appointed counsel for
expenditures incurred in traveling to interview an informer and visiting the
scene of the crime.27 Concluding that this refusal constituted a denial of as-
sistance of counsel, the court found that the sixth amendment requires the
appointment of "competent counsel, effective counsel and counsel that have
an opportunity and time to prepare and present their indigent clients'
cases."
28
In United States v. Products Marketing,29 a similar question arose concern-
ing the availability of advance funding for the trial preparation of a court-ap-
pointed attorney. In this case, involving conspiracy to use the United States
mails to defraud, court-appointed counsel and the defendants did not reside
experienced criminal defense lawyers might debate its propriety." Id. Should the ques-
tion prove debatable, counsel's assistance would not be found ineffective.
24. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1968), quoting United States v. Ewell,
383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966), where the Court, in considering the right to a speedy trial,
discussed the three basic demands of the criminal justice system which the constitutional
guarantee was designed to protect. The third demand is "to limit the possibilities that
long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." Id.
25. The "mockery of justice" and "gross incompetence" standards are workable only
in a post-conviction context because evidence of the failure of counsel is apparent only
at this time. Those standards requiring the defendant to demonstrate the prejudicial
effect of ineffective counsel are similarly limited in effectiveness.
26. 32 F.R.D. 421 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
27. It was conceded by the government that the witness was material in the case
pending against Germany. Id. at 422.
28. Id. at 423.
29. 281 F. Supp. 349 (D. Del. 1968).
,[Vol. 24:352
Casenotes
in nearby districts, witnesses were located throughout the country, and ade-
quate preparation for defense would have required a considerable expend-
iture of money.80 Because the government refused to advance the requisite
funds for trial preparation, the defendants were held to have been deprived
of effective assistance of counsel.31
These varying attempts to define the performance required of an attorney
demonstrate the prevailing confusion which surrounds this constitutional
right.
II. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS VINDICATED
A. The D.C. Superior Court Test
United States v. Chatman represents a significant attempt to clarify the
parameters of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
and to fashion a just remedy. Judge Halleck found that the prevailing test
of counsel's performance in the District of Columbia was "whether taken as
a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice and whether the representation
was so incompetent as to blot out the essence of a substantial defense or de-
prive the defendant of a trial in any real sense."3 2 This test, which is closely
related to the more stringent tests discussed above, places a heavy burden
of proof upon a defendant. Acknowledging that these tests may be appro-
priate when used in an appellate or collateral challenge, the court rejected
their use at the trial level, claiming that "a court cannot be blind to injustice
occurring in its presence."' 33 To avoid this injustice, Judge Halleck adopted
the formula of adequate representation stated in United States v. De Coster, 4
30. The court noted that it was clear that advancement of funds required to prepare
an adequate defense given this set of circumstances was not contemplated within the
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act. Id. at 351.
31. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1963), where the Court would not allow
a defendant's indigency to thwart his sixth amendment rights. See also Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
32. Criminal No. 28538-74, at 2-3.
33. Id. at 3. For an interesting discussion of the frequency of such occurrences,
see Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification
Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FoRa. L. REv. 227 (1973). The Chief Justice
there adopts a working hypothesis "that from one-third to one-half of the lawyers
who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate repre-
sentation." Id. at 234. He proposes that priority be given to the certification of law-
yers in the "one crucial specialty of trial advocacy that is so basic to a fair system
of justice and has had historic recognition in the common law systems." Id. at 240.
For further discussion of the need for legal specialization, see Cheatham, The Growing
Need for Specialized Legal Services, 16 VAND. L. REv. 497 (1963); Derrick, Specializa-
tion in the Law-Texas Develops Pilot Plan for Specialization in Criminal Law, Labor
L w, Family Law, 36 TEXAs B.J. 393 (1973).
34. Criminal No. 72-1283, at 9-10 (D.C. Super. Ct., October 4, 1973).
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where the trial court -took all possible steps to guarantee a defendant a rea-
sonably competent attorney acting as a "diligent and conscientious advo-
cate."85 Using this test as the basis of its decision, the court concluded that
defendants had not received adequate legal representation and therefore had
been deprived of their sixth amendment rights.
B. Comparison of Chatman With the Third and Fourth Circuits
The Superior Court of the District of Columbia has adopted a test which
parallels those of the Third and Fourth Circuits. The requirement adopted
by the Chatman court, that an attorney be a "diligent and conscientious ad-
vocate" is similar to the "community standards" test of the Third Circuit.
Both tests entitle a defendant to the quality of counsel prevalent in
the jurisdiction at the time of trial. Furthermore, pre-trial application of this
standard results in recognition of a duty of care on the part of the attorney
at this key stage without the tort law requirement of proven dam-
age.86 Additionally, a "diligent and conscientious advocate" must of nec-
essity meet the five minimal requirements of effective counsel established by
the Fourth Circuit.8 7
The Chatman standard will aid in lessening defendant's onerous burden
of proof. Once a supportable challenge is made to counsel's performance,
the burden of proof will shift to the government to prove that performance
was commensurate with the sixth amendment right which it represents.
Moreover, by abolishing the prevailing damage requirement, the court has
eliminated an element of proof which may only become demonstrable after
a full trial.
CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the government conceded the unavailability of qualified
counsel as defined by the Chatman court, and requested a continuance. The
court, however, viewed the situation as one of indefinite duration and, in re-
jecting the government's request, concluded that it could not "in conscience
leave these defendants in limbo, suffering all the disabilities and anxiety at-
tendant to a criminal prosecution. '18
35. Criminal No. 28538-74, at 3.
36. See p. 355 & note 20 supra.
37. See p. 355 & note 21 supra.
38. Criminal No. 28538-74, at 6. Although the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial was not specifically mentioned by the court, on the facts before it, continuance
in the case of defendant Crawford would have been "tantamount to indefinite incar-
ceration. . . a] patently unconstitutional result." Id. at 5,
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The only alternate remedy available to the court was dismissal. While rec-
ognizing that this is a severe sanction, the court was motivated by several
overriding considerations. First, it recognized the right to counsel as possibly
the most important right of those contained in the first ten amendments, "for
without counsel, few would be sophisticated or knowledgeable enough to as-
sert any other constitutionally secured right."'39  Secondly, dismissal was
viewed in the public interest as a means of insuring a healthy, viable adver-
sary system of justice. Finally, the court acknowledged dismissal as the
"long-accepted remedy for violations of other sixth amendment guarantees. '40
The Chatman decision provides a valuable contribution to sixth amend-
ment case law. The standards adopted by the court are designed to result
in a more equitable shift of the burden of proof when a defendant chooses
to challenge the adequacy of assigned counsel. Dismissal in this situation
protects the interests of both society and the defendant by ensuring the main-
tenance of the adversary system of justice while at the same time giving
meaning to sixth amendment rights at a "critical stage" in a criminal proceed-
ing.
Wayne Keup
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 9. The court cited Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973), which
held dismissal to be the only remedy capable of vindicating the sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial. Use of a continuance in cases involving lack of funds for trial prepa-
ration is particularly suspect in view of the sixth amendment requirement of a speedy
trial. This requirement becomes dependent upon a non-judicial decision either to allo-
cate or to withhold funds. See United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421, 424-25 (N.D.
Ala. 1963), where the court held the denial of effective assistance of counsel to so prej-
udice the defendant's case as to warrant dismissal of the indictment and release of de-
fendant from government custody; and United States v. Products Marketing, 281 F.
Supp. 349, 353 (D. Del. 1968), where the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
stating that to rule otherwise "would be to patently ignore the serious deprivation of
Sixth Amendment rights and render chimerical defendants' guarantees of effective
counsel." Dismissal in Chatman was entered without prejudice, a solution satisfactory
to both the government and the defendant. Employment of this remedy preserves the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, while at the same time it allows the
government to reinstitute the action when the funding crisis has passed.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process Fairness Requires
that Accused Be Given a Pre-Trial Discovery Right to a Lineup
When Eyewitness Identification Is a Material Issue and There Is
a Reasonable Possibility of an Initial Mistaken Identification.
Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 121 (1974).
The scope of the rights afforded criminal defendants with respect to line-
up identifications' has been heavily litigated in recent years.2 This litigation
is due in great part to the frequency and materiality of mis-identifications, 3
and to the reality that the identification of the accused can for all practical
purposes be determinative of a verdict of guilt or innocence. In Evans v.
Superior Court,4 the Supreme Court of California has recognized the im-
portance of identification evidence and, as a matter of discovery due process,
the right of a criminal defendant, in appropriate cases, to a pre-trial lineup.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (the sixth amendment does
not grant an accused the right to have counsel present at a post-indictment photographic
identification display); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (the per se exclusionary
rule of Wade and Gilbert does not apply to pre-indictment identification confronta-
tions); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (violation of due process in an identifi-
cation confrontation depends on the totality of surrounding circumstances); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (when there is an illegal lineup, a subsequent in-court
identification can be admitted only if it is of independent origin); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (an accused has a sixth amendment right to counsel at a post-
indictment lineup).
2. The lineup discussed in Evans is a corporeal lineup, as distinguished from other
forms of lineups such as a photographic display. This distinction can be important, as
it was in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), in which the Court held that the
sixth amendment does not grant a defendant the right to counsel at a post-indictment
display of photographs to a witness for identification purposes since, unlike an actual
lineup, the display can be made in the physical absence of the defendant and thus does
not constitute a "critical stage" of the prosecution.
3. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967), Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, stated that "[tihe vagaries of eyewitness identification are well known;
the annuals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." Judge
Jerome Frank has stated that "perhaps erroneous identification of the accused constitutes
the major cause of known wrongful convictions." J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY
61 (1957). Felix Frankfurter, while still a professor at Harvard, remarked:
What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The
identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such
testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records
of English and American trials. These instances are recent-not due to the
brutalities of ancient criminal procedure.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1924).
4. 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1974).
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Evans involved a robbery in which, within minutes of the commission of
the crime at a drive-in restaurant, the police arrested Vernel Evans and his
co-defendant. The suspects were taken by the police to the scene of the crime
for the purpose of identification by the robbery victims. At this encounter
the suspects were seated in the back of a police car, and the robbery victims
identified them by viewing only the backs of their heads and shoulders. The
basis on which the victims made their identification was that the suspects had
the same general build as the robbers. During this encounter the victims
never viewed or identified the suspects face-to-face, in spite of the fact that
the robbers had faced the victims during most of the robbery.
At the preliminary hearing, one of the robbery victims identified Evans
by pointing him out in the courtroom. Prior to trial, Evans filed a notice
of motion for lineup.5 The trial court agreed that the defendant should
have been given the opportunity to participate in a lineup, but the court
denied Evans' motion because, in its view, it lacked the discretion to compel
the state to conduct a pre-trial lineup. Evans' subsequent petition to the
California Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition or mandamus6 was
denied. The California Supreme Court granted Evans' petition for a hearing
and ordered that an alternative writ of mandate7 issue, with the trial court
proceedings stayed pending final determination of the supreme court pro-
ceedings.
The Supreme Court of California, in an opinion by Chief Justice Wright,8
reversed the trial court, requiring it to vacate or show cause why it should
5. It was argued in support of the motion that the limited identification of Evans
was faulty, and that because of the witnesses' commitment to their identifications they
would be reluctant to change their minds later at trial, even if in error. The defendant
also argued that the witnesses would be highly unlikely to reappraise conscientiously
their identification of the defendant because he was black, would be in jail denims, and
would be seated at the defense table. Id. at 621, 522 P.2d at 683, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
123.
6. A writ of prohibition is a remedy available to correct an improper denial of dis-
covery. It is a petition to an appellate court to prevent the trial of a defendant on
grounds that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. The basis of this petition in a discovery
context is that, because of certain conditions which prevailed at the preliminary hearing,
the defendant has been committed without probable cause. See Comment, Discovery
in California Criminal Cases: Its Importance and its Pitfalls, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 251,
257 (1965). A writ of mandamus is another remedy available to correct an improper
denial of discovery. It is issued only when the lower court has abused its discretion.
For a more complete analysis of the remedies available to challenge improper discovery
rulings, see Comment, supra.
7. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1084 (West 1955) defines a writ of mandate as the
equivalent of the writ of mandamus.
8. Justices McComb, Tobriner, Mask, Burke, and Sullivan concurred in Justice
Wright's opinion. Justice Clark concurred in the order.
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not vacate its order which denied Evans the right to a lineup prior to his
trial. The supreme court held that a criminal defendant had a right to a
pre-trial lineup when his identification was a material issue in the trial, and
when there was a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification which a
lineup would tend to rectify.9 In reaching its decision, the California Su-
preme Court utilized the discovery principles inherent in the concept of due
process fairness to give the accused access to reliable, concrete, pre-trial iden-
tification evidence. This note will explore these discovery due process
principles and their application to pre-trial identification evidence.
I. PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY AND THE DUE PROCESS
DISCOVERY PRINCIPLES
A general judicial policy against criminal discovery has long existed and
currently persists.' 0 Many courts and commentators have stated that .the
Constitution does not require the granting of any right to defense discovery."
While the United States Supreme Court has favored the development of
broad defense discovery,' 2 it has been restrained in developing the constitu-
9. 11 Cal. 3d at 625, 522 P.2d at 686, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
10. A criminal defendant had no right of discovery at common law. The King v.
Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). Most states afford discovery to the criminal
defendant only in certain specific situations. See, e.g., Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182
S.E.2d 779 (1971); Lander v. State, 238 Ind. 680, 154 N.E.2d 507 (1958); State v. Mas-
trian, 285 Minn. 51, 171 N.W.2d 695 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 (1970); State
v. Nussbaum, 261 Ore. 87, 491 P.2d 1013 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 372 P.2d 919, 921, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 881 (1962); State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 136, 145 A.2d 313, 315 (19.58);
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228, 242
n.77 (1964).
12. One description of the aims of criminal discovery is as follows:
To enable each side in a suit to obtain relevant information from the other
about the issues in dispute; to safeguard against surprise at trial; to define the
issues narrowly and clearly so the parties can focus the evidence on them; to
assist in ascertaining truth and detecting perjury; to encourage settlements by
educating the parties in advance on the courtroom chances of their claims and
defenses; and to assure the availability of probative evidence to the party whom
it helps.
Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Con-
stitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 437 (1972). The reasons for this restraint
are not altogether clear, though one possible reason may be judicial concern for the in-
tegrity of the criminal justice system. There may also be a concern over eroding the
prosecution's ability to convict guilty defendants. See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecu-
tion: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279. Chief Justice Ar-
thur T. Vanderbilt set forth four arguments, in State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881
(1953), against criminal discovery. He argued that a defendant who knew the whole
case against him would perjure himself and suppress evidence, and that he would attempt
to bribe witnesses who would be reluctant to offer evidence. Also, because of the de-
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tional foundation that would require such discovery. In a line of cases
beginning in the 1930's and climaxing in Giles v. Maryland1' and Brady v.
Maryland,14 the Supreme Court developed the first of its three narrow dis-
covery principles mandated by the Constitution, holding "that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."'1 The corol-
lary to this principle is that the prosecution has a duty to disclose such evi-
dence to a defendant. However, this language has never been construed to
require pre-trial disclosure; disclosure only of evidence that is material,
and exculpatory or favorable to the defendant is all that is required.
The second discovery principle evolved by the Court is a requirement of
disclosure of certain types of evidence, regardless of whether it is exculpatory.
The defendant is entitled by "the fundamental requirements of fairness"' 6 to
pre-trial disclosure of the name and address of an informant who might have
information pertinent to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 1'7
Although no new discovery principles were developed in Williams v.
Florida,8 the Supreme Court reiterated its support for criminal discovery.
In Williams, the Court found that Florida's notice of alibi statute did not de-
prive the defendant of due process or a fair trial, due to the fact that Florida's
law provided for liberal discovery by the accused, and contained reciprocal
duties for 'the state to perform. As far as the Court was concerned, the adver-
sary nature of a trial is not a legitimate end in itself.19 In terms of due proc-
ess, the Court found ample room in the adversary system for the Florida stat-
fendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination, criminal discovery would be a
one-way street, making successful prosecution almost impossible. Furthermore, expan-
sion of safeguards for the defendant will not tend to decrease the already rising crime
rate.
13. 386 U.S. 66 (1967). The Supreme Court remanded this case to determine
whether the accused was denied due process. At the trial for rape, the prosecution had
suppressed evidence favorable to the accused, and had used testimony that it knew was
perjured.
14. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (the defendant was denied due process by the prosecution's
withholding of the co-defendant's extrajudicial statement in which the co-defendant ad-
mitted the actual homicide).
15. Id. at 87. See Nakell, supra note 12, at 452. See also Moore v. Illinois, 408
U.S. 786 (1972); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386
U.S. 66 (1967); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957).
17. Compare id., with McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); see Nakell,
supra note 12, at 461-62.
18. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
19. Id. at 82; see, e.g., Brennan, supra note 12.
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ute, "which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial
by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate
certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence. '20
In Wardius v. Oregon,21 the Supreme Court developed its third discovery
principle based on the rationale of fundamental fairness. The Court unani-
mously held that the Oregon notice of alibi statute violated due process since
it prevented defense introduction of alibi evidence in the absence of a notice
of alibi, and did not provide reciprocal discovery for the defense. The Court
did not hold that the due process clause necessitated criminal discovery for
a defendant, rather it found that the due process clause spoke to the reci-
procity of evidence and the "balance of forces between the accused and his
accuser. 22  The Court held "that in the absence of a strong showing of state
interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The State
may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense wit-
nesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own wit-
nesses."
23
There is little, if any, authority dealing with the rationale of the Supreme
Court's discovery principles in the specific context of a pre-trial discovery
right to a lineup. Generally speaking, the accused has no absolute right to
compel a lineup, whether it be an in-court identification during trial, 24 or,
absent a pre-trial request, an out-of-court lineup.2 5 Some courts have recog-
20. 399 U.S. at 82.
21. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). For a discussion of the effect of Wardius on criminal dis-
covery, see Nakell, The Effect of Due Process on Criminal Defense Discovery, 62 Ky.
L.J. 58 (1973).
22. 412 U.S. at 474.
23. Id. at 475. In a footnote to this statement the Court says that "the State's inher-
ent information-gathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in dis-
covery rights, it should work in the defendant's favor." Id. n.9. Within this note
the Court supported this viewpoint by quoting extensively from Note, Prosecu-
torial Discovery under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L, REV. 994 (1972).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 912 (1971) (the defendant does not have a right to an in-court identification
whenever he requests it, but it is left to the trial judge's discretion); People v. Finch,
47 I11. 2d 425, 266 N.E.2d 97 (1960) (a request for a pre-trial lineup and an in-court
lineup was denied); Commonwealth v. Jones, 287 N.E.2d 599 (Mass. 1972) (ruling on
a motion to seat a defendant in the courtroom audience or for an in-court lineup is
within the sound discretion of the trial judee).
25. See, e.g., United States v. King, 461 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (failure to hold
a corporal lineup does not transgress the due process clause); Moye v. State, 122 Ga.
App. 14, 176 S.E.2d 180 (1970) (a prior lineup identification is not a prerequisite to
every in-court lineup); People v. Solomon, 47 Mich. App. 208, 209 N.W.2d 257 (19-73)
(the accused is not entitled to a lineup every time eyewitness testimony and identifica-
tion is contemplated in court); State v. Haselhorst, 476 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. 1972) (the




nized that a request for a pre-trial lineup is addressed to the discretion of
the trial court. 26 A California decision, People v. London,27 recognized the
inherent suggestiveness of an in-court identification of a defendant who is
seated at a counsel table, but denied defendant's request for a lineup conclud-
ing that "it is not for this court, operating at our intermediate level, to intro-
duce an additional requirement on police and prosecutors. 2 8  Five years
after this decision, the California Supreme Court relied on the due process
clause to create a right to a pre-trial lineup.
II. THE DUE PROCESS DISCOVERY PRINCIPLES AND Evans
By recognizing the right to a pre-trial lineup, the California Supreme Court
indicated that it was not concerned with "whether the people's affirmative
evidence of identification is so impermissibly unfair that its receipt would in-
fringe an accused's rights of due process. '29 Rather, the court focused on
the question of "whether prior to the in-court receipt of evidence of identifica-
tion the accused can insist that procedures be afforded whereby the weakness
of the identification ev' dence, if it is in fact weak, can be disclosed."'30 Since
the accused may not be deprived of liberty in the absence of procedures
which comport with due process requirements, the Evans court identified the
issue as one of "fairness to an accused on pretrial discovery." 3' 1
In determining what kind of pre-trial discovery process must be afforded
the criminal defendant the California Supreme Court scrutinized the estab-
lished discovery rights in that state. The court found that the pre-trial lineup
fell within the scope of the prosecution's duty to disclose, based on the fact
that it has substantial and material evidence which is favorable to the de-
26. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 441 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 840 (1971) (the decision on a motion for a pre-trial lineup is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the trial judge); United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d
Cir. 1970). In Ravich, Judge Friendly stated:
We would likewise not be disposed to hold a line-up to be so essential to the
presentation of a proper defense concerning identification that refusal to ar-
range one on a defendant's request is a denial of due process of law. On the
other hand, we can well see how a prompt line-up might be of value both to
an innocent accused and to law enforcement officers. A pre-trial request by
a defendant for a lineup is thus addressed to the sound discretion of the district
court and should be carefully considered.
Id. at 1203.
27. 274 Cal. App. 2d 241, 78 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1969).
28. Id. at 243, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
29. 11 Cal. 3d at 621-22, 522 P.2d at 684, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
30. Id. at 622, 522 P.2d at 684, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
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fense.32 Such disclosure is based upon the fundamental principle that a trial
is a search for truth, rather than a game.33
In Evans, the court found that "[e]vidence of identification in criminal
proceedings is not only material but is also frequently determinative of an
accused's guilt." 3 4  Building on this finding, the court utilized the rationale
of Williams to support its conclusion that there is no reason why the criminal
defendant should be denied a lineup by which he might gain material identi-
fication evidence, since the prosecutor already enjoys that same right. Wil-
liams approved the use of such reciprocal discovery because it allowed "the
defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial
to the determination of guilt or innocence. '35  Wardius went beyond simple
approval of reciprocal discovery by holding that the Constitution requires it.3s
Evans interpreted Wardius as requiring that discovery must be a two-way
street in light of the mandate of due process fairness.
The Evans court further found that the state cannot refuse to disclose evi-
dence that is within its reach and unavailable to the accused merely on the
grounds that the evidence sought is not within the state's present knowledge.
The larger resources that a prosecutor possesses along with the court's desire
that justice be done are factors which place duties as well as restraints on
the prosecution. In a number of varying fact situations the California Su-
preme Court has recognized the duty that the state bears in not only disclos-
ing information but in acquiring information that is material to the defense
of the accused.37
32. The state recognized this duty to disclose. In addition to this category of dis-
covery, the state also recognized the discovery categories set out in the following cases:
People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965) (statements
by a codefendant or alleged conspirator to state agents); Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.
2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959) (statements by prospective witnesses to agents of the
state); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957) (prior statements
by the defendant to the police or prosecution authorities); Norton v. Superior Court, 173
Cal. App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (1959) (the names and addresses of eyewitnesses known
to the prosecution); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130
(1957) (physical evidence in possession of the prosecution). While Evans was pending
on appeal, the California Supreme Court recognized another category in Hill v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1974) (prior felony convic-
tions of prosecution witnesses).
33. See p. 363 supra.
34. 11 Cal. 3d at 623, 522 P.2d at 685, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
35. 399 U.S. at 82.
36. See Nakell, supra note 21, at 59-66.
37. See People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 505 P.2d 537, 106 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1973)
(location of informer); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1966) (submission of a complaining witness in a sex case to a psychiatric
examination when defendant shows a compelling reason); People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal. 2d
748, 349 P.2d 673, 3 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960) (disclosure of identity of informer); In re
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Evans followed this line of California cases. The defense in Evans had
moved for discovery of material identification evidence not then within the
state's knowledge. Chief Justice Wright found that the denial of that motion
had the same net effect as intentionally suppressing existing evidence. Em-
ploying the principle of Brady,3 the court found that the intentional sup-
pression of material evidence violates due process in that it denies the ac-
cused a fair trial.
The Evans court enumerated certain criteria that must be satisfied be-
fore the accused is entitled to a lineup. The issue of identity must be mate-
rial;39 there must be a reasonable likelihood of a mis-identification having oc-
curred, and the situation must be one in which a lineup would tend to resolve
any mistake. The determination of whether these criteria are satisfied rests
within the broad discretion of the trial judge,40 who must balance the rights
of the accused against the burdens such lineup procedures would entail for
the prosecutor.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision in Evans v. Superior Court established a right which has been
previously denied by the courts. Pre-trial lineup procedures are necessary
if the accused is to obtain reliable and independent evidence which enables
him to challenge, in a concrete manner, an identification that may be inac-
curate. In California the accused can come to trial fully prepared to attack
the identification evidence presented.
When viewed in light of Brady and Wardius, Evans clearly indicates a con-
tinued expansion of criminal discovery. Evans bases its rationale firmly
within the constitutional requirement of due process fairness, providing the
accused with a right that the prosecution has long enjoyed as a matter of
investigative discovery. A firm resolution of whether the recent discovery
principles developed by the Supreme Court will be viewed as compelling
additional -defense access to the evidence developed through -the investigative
procedures of -the prosecution is, of course, yet to be -rendered. Nevertheless,
Evans takes a significant step in expanding the defendant's right of discovery
consistent with the concept of due process fairness.
Edward C. Monahan
Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1959) (providing intoximeter test or
blood sample).
38. See note 14 supra.
39. It should be noted that this requirement may not be significant since in Evans
the court states that "[elvidence of identification in criminal proceedings is not only
material but is also frequently determinative of an accused's guilt." 11 Cal. 3d at 623,
522 P.2d at 685, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
40. See note 26 supra.
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CRIMINAL LAW-Unstipulated Polygraph Evidence Admis-
sible Under Certain Conditions in Criminal Trials. Common-
wealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
The use of polygraph tests as evidence in criminal trials has generated con-
siderable controversy.' Few courts have allowed polygraph evidence to be
admitted, and even where it has been admitted, its use has been qualified
by requiring that the prosecution and the defense agree to written stipula-
tions2 allowing admission of the test results regardless of their outcome.,"
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently reevaluated the poly-
graph issue in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1) 4 and held polygraph
1. The vast majority of cases deciding the admissibility of polygraph evidence have
adopted total exclusion. For a catalogue of those cases, see 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 999 n.2 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
2. Significant decisions allowing admission of stipulated polygraph evidence in-
clude State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962) (specific qualifications for
admission include written stipulation; opportunity to cross-examine examiner regarding
his oualifications, conditions under which test was administered, and possibilities of er-
ror: iurv instruction that examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any
element of the crime); People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1948) (conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct attained by admitting unfavora-
ble results of defendant's test affirmed); State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849
(1972) (conviction affirmed on showing that Valdez qualifications were met); State V.
Alderete, 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (1974) (test results admissible where proper foun-
dation laid). See Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of its Place in the Law of
Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381 (1964); Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the
Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711 (1953); Comment, Lie Detector Tests: Possible
Admissibility Upon Stipulation, 4 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PRO. 244 (1971);
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973).
3. Decisions allowing polygraph evidence without written stipulations are: United
States v. Dioguardi, Crim. No. 72-1102 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 30, 1972), in N.Y. Times, Dec.
2, 1972, at 39, col. 7-8 (dismissal of charges on basis of favorable test results); United
States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.) (evidence admitted at pre-trial hearing),
rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp.
90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (perjury conviction where court set down specific conditions for
admission); United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (results of gov-
ernment's test of chief witness admissible for defendant); People v. Cutter, 12 CRIM.
L. REP. 2133 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 6, 1972) (admission at suppression hearing to show
lack of consent to search); State v. Watson, 115 N.J. 213, 278 A.2d 543 (Hudson
County Ct. 1971) (evidence used to show facts not decided at trial for post-conviction
sentencing hearing); Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Queens
County Ct. 1972) (evidence allowed in case involving perjury); In re Stenzel, 71 Misc.
2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Niagra County Ct. 1972) (evidence admissible to determine
paternity of illegitimate child); People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens
County Ct. 1938), impliedly overruled in People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31
(1938).
4. 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
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evidence admissible in limited situations. Significantly, the decision did not
require written stipulations 5 to allow evidentiary use of the polygraph.
The defendant, a juvenile, was charged with the murder of a nine year
old boy. At a preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a motion6 to intro-
duce evidence of his polygraph test because the results had shown that he
was telling the truthT when he denied having caused, directly or indirectly,
the victim's death. Although the trial judge found polygraph tests generally
accepted in the scientific community, he was not convinced of their "wide-
spread acceptance" in the courts.8 Citing prior case law,9 the judge denied
the defendant's motion.
Based largely on circumstantial evidence, 10 a superior court jury verdict
found the juvenile "a delinquent by reason of manslaughter."" On this
second appeal' 2 to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant
argued that polygraph tests should be generally admissible as scientific evi-
dence. Although holding that only "limited admission" would be allowed, the
court conditionally reversed' the verdict on the ground that the trial court
had denied the defendant's motion to introduce polygraph evidence. Its deci-
sion was based upon a finding tha-t significant progress had been made in the
5. For a sample written stipulation, see State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d
1343 (1972); J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 251 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as REID & INIBAU].
6. The defendant filed supplemental oral motions requesting that (1) the court ap-
point a polygraph expert to re-test the juvenile, or that (2) the Commonwealth be or-
dered to examine the juvenile with their own experts. The results of these tests would
be admissible along with the defendant's test results. 313 N.E.2d at 123.
7. The polygraph does not detect lies. Its only function is to "distinguish between
the whole truth and something less than the whole truth." Ferguson, Polygraphy v.
Outdated Precedent, 35 TEXAS B.J. 531, 536 (1972).
8. 313 N.E.2d at 123.
9. The trial judge relied primarily upon Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266,
191 N.E.2d 479 (1963).
10. The evidence consisted of several incriminating statements made by the juvenile
concerning little known facts of the crime, his inability to account for his whereabouts
shortly after the victim was last seen alive, and a pair of slightly bloodstained shoes that
the police found in his closet.
11. 313 N.E.2d at 122. Pursuant to MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 58 (1974), the
juvenile was found to have violated the penal laws of Massachusetts and was adjudged
a delinquent child.
12. The first appeal, Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 280 N.E.2d 144 (Mass. 1972),
resulted in the reversal of a verdict of delinquency by reason of second deg:ee murder
on the ground that the defendant had been prevented from using the transcript of the
district court delinquency hearing for impeachment purposes in the superior court trial.
Id. at 146.
13. The reversal was contingent upon the defendant's success on a motion for a new
trial. The motion for a new trial was limited to the question of the admissibility of
polygraph evidence. See 313 N.E.2d at 132.
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polygraphic profession which had resulted in increased polygraph examiner
competence and improved test reliability. 14 By confining the Juvenile (No. 1)
decision to limited admission of polygraphic evidence, the court avoided over-
ruling precedent which had barred the general admission of polygraph
evidence in criminal trials.
In dissent, Justice Quirico argued that restrictions should be imposed on
polygraph testing if it was to be admitted into evidence and suggested a court-
appointed commission to study polygraphs. This idea was supported in the
dissent of Justice Kaplan.' 5
The primary significance of the Juvenile (No. 1) decision stems -from its
admission of unstipulated polygraph evidence. Therefore, this note will
concentrate on the standards required by the court to insure the quality of
polygraph evidence in criminal trials.
I. THE EXCLUSION RULE
The first appellate decision to address the question of the admissibility of
polygraph evidence was Frye v. United States,' where it was held that the
results of a systolic blood pressure test' 7 were inadmissible at trial due to the
test's lack of "general acceptance in the particular field [of science] in which
it belongs."'18 In light of the early stage of development of the polygraph,
it can be argued that there was legal validity for the rule which was
14. One estimate of polygraph accuracy is 87.75%. Horvath & Reid, The Reliability
o0 Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 276,
278 (1971). Another commentator found the accuracy to be 95%. Wicker, supra
note 2, at 713. The authors of an authorative text on the polygraph found its ac-
curacy to be 94%. REID & INBAU 234-35. But see Highleyman, The Deceptive Cer-
tainty of the "Lie Detector," 10 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 62 (1958), citing findings of only
75% accuracy.
15. Justice Kaplan referred to the polygraph by saying that "in the family of scientific
aids to the forensic search for truth, the polygraph remains a rather remote relation of
shabby gentility." 313 N.E.2d at 138.
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). It should be noted that the test taken in Frye
showed that he was not guilty of the murder for which he was convicted. He was re-
leased from prison three years later after a third party confessed to the crime. See
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL 265 (1948) as
cited in Wicker, supra note 2, at 715. See also Bailey, Book Review, 1 SUFFOLK U.L.
REv. 137 (1967).
17. The systolic blood pressure test measured the blood pressure only, and the ex-
aminer had only that factor to rely on in making his interpretations. The present poly-
graph measures the blood pressure, pulse, respiration, psychogalvanic skin response, and
muscular activity, and the examiner considers all of these factors in making his prog-
nosis. See REI & INBAU 2-5.
18. 293 F. at 1014.
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adopted. 19 The Frye precedent has survived since 1923, though the determi-
nation it called for, whether the polygraph has gained scientific acceptance
through improvements, has rarely been undertaken. 20
Drawing upon the Frye precedent, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, in Commonwealth v. Fatalo,2' sustained a trial court rejection of
polygraph evidence. Justice Spiegel, writing for ithe majority, relied upon
several outspoken critics 22 of the polygraph test to illustrate the human
"defects" '28 which could adversely affect the test results. Pointing out the
wide spectrum of opinions on polygraph reliability, 24 the court found that
such a controversy was conducive to creating a "battle of the experts" 25 with
the determination of guilt or innocence of little consequence. This possibility
compelled the Fatalo court to adopt the standard for admission enunciated
in Frye, with the caveat that admission would be allowed upon the resolution
of the "substantial doubts which presently revolve about the polygraph
test."'26
A small number of jurisdictions27 have advanced positions contrary to
19. Contra, Note, The Admissibility of Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Evidence Pursu-
ant to Stipulation in Criminal Proceedings, 5 AKRON L. REV. 235, 239-40 (1972).
20. For other legal objections to the admissibility of polygraph evidence, see Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 245 n.4.
21. 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963). This was a question of first impression
for the Massachusetts courts. In Fatalo, the defendant's favorable test results were not
admitted in a prosecution for assault.
22. Highleyman, supra note 14; Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evi-
dence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961).
23. The "defects" pertain to physical infirmities such as allergies, coughing spells,
hiccups, high or low blood pressure, shock, "circumscribed amnesia," and to a variety
of psychological abnormalities. See Highleyman, supra note 14, at 55-60; Note, The
Polygraph Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 111, 121-22
(1969).
24. See note 14 supra.
25. 346 Mass. at 269, 191 N.E.2d at 481. See United States v. Urquidez, 356 F.
Supp. 1363, 1365 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
26. 346 Mass. at 269, 191 N.E.2d at 481. It is noteworthy that the Fatalo ruling
has been reaffirmed, in dicta, three times since 1963. See Commonwealth v. Corcione,
307 N.E.2d 321, 327 (Mass. 1974) (defendant's remark concerning expected failure of
test inadmissible in criminal prosecution); Commonwealth v. Richards, 293 N.E.2d 854,
861-62 (Mass. 1973) (nonresponsive remark concerning witness' test unobjected to at
trial not grounds for appeal); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 354 Mass. 549, 557, 238 N.E.2d
525, 530 (1968) (evidence of defendant's test not relied on by court but sanctioned in
concurring opinion).
27. In addition to those cited above, see note 2 supra, state decisions accepting poly-
graph evidence with written stipulations include: State v. Brown, 177 So. 2d 532 (Fla.
1965); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964); State v. Fields, 434
S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972); State
v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974). See also People v. Potts, 74 Ill.
App. 2d 301, 220 N.E.2d 251 (1966).
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those taken in Fatalo and Frye on the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
State v. Valdez28 is representative of a line of cases allowing admission con-
tingent upon written stipulations and limited to corroboration of testimony.2 9
The court in Valdez also required special jury instructions to counteract the
"supposed" conclusive weight of polygraph evidence on judges and juries.30
This decision emphasized that the trial court was the final arbiter of the
validity of the test and of the reliability of the examiner.
A more recent case, United States v. Ridling,31 also rejected the total ex-
clusion principle of the Frye line of decisions by holding that polygraph relia-
bility was to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 32 Recognizing the lack
of standardized competence in the polygraphic profession, the court held that,
prior to admission, testing by a court-appointed examiner would be necessary
"to provide an independent check on the opinion of the defendant's expert
and to make certain that the subject is testable. ' 33  The Ridling court also
found that where the defendant's truthfulness is not directly in issue, the poly-
graph evidence could only be used by the prosecution to impeach the defend-
ant's credibility and could be used by the defendant only to offset attacks
on the veracity of his testimony.34 The Ridling decision thus delineated the
outer limits which courts had previously approached in the admission of poly-
graph evidence.
II. ADMISSION RULE UNDER Juvenile (No. 1)
In Juvenile (No. 1), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court established
certain safeguards to limit the admission of polygraph evidence and to main-
tain a consistent level of qualified examiners. 35  These precautions were
28. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). The court set down specific conditions for
admission in an appeal of a conviction for possession of narcotics. See State v. Ross,
7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216
N.W.2d 8 (1974).
29. See 91 Ariz. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900.
30. Id. at 280-82, 371 P.2d at 898. See United States v. Zeigler, 350 F. Supp. 685,
691 (D.D.C. 1972), discussing the weight of polygraph evidence:
The problem which has traditionally caused the courts the greatest concern in
this regard is the possibility that the jury might consider the examiner's opinion
to be so conclusive on the issue of guilt or innocence as to intrude and usurp
its historical role and perogatives.
31. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
32. Id. at 94.
33. Id. at 97. The Ridling court specifically focused on the expert's opinion. This
is due, in part, to the fact that at least 10% of all polygraph tests are "uninterpretable
by even the most skilled examiner." Horvath & Reid, suora note 14, at 278.
34. See PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. Doc. No. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 404, 608 (1973).
35. Implicit in the control of examiners is the assumption that better examiners pro-
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necessitated by the warning in Ridling that "the chance of serious impropriety
on the part of polygraph examiners must be considered."'36
Concern for examiner competence compelled the Ridling requirement that
defendant's tests be independently checked for conclusiveness of interpreta-
tion. The Juvenile (No. 1) decision reflected this need for closer supervision
of the defendant's examiner by requiring the trial judge to go through an ex-
tensive voir dire inquiry into the examiner's qualifications. As in Valdez,
the final determination of the examiner's competence is left up to the trial
judge's discretion. Despite contrary opinions by some legislatures 37 and legal
commentators 38 the Juvenile (No. 1) court declined to set specific standards
of competence, but did emphasize that the "combination of training, experi-
ence and demonstrated ability" 39 were determinative criteria in the trial
judge's inquiry. The court maintained that exacting guidelines created
collateral problems and that the trial judges should not be "unduly shackled
in the exercise of their judgement. ' 40
By placing discretion with the trial judge to supervise examiner compe-
tence, Juvenile (No. 1) demonstrated an approach different from that
advanced by the Ridling court concerning the admissibility of polygraph
evidence. 41  Moreover the decision exemplifies a trend towards general
admission of polygraph tests by its rejection of the Valdez requirement of
written stipulations.
Where prior cases had required that the prosecution and the defense agree
to admission of polygraph tests through written stipulations, 42 the Massachu-
duce better and more reliable test results. See Horvath & Reid, supra note 14, at 281;
Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1120, 1124 (1973).
36. 313 N.E.2d at 125, quoting 350 F. Supp. at 96.
37. For a brief description of the legislation, see 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 101, 115 n.74
(1973); Note, supra note 35, at 1124 n.25; Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1324 (1970).
38. One commentator has recommended that the examiner be required: (1) to pos-
sess a college degree; (2) to have had at least six months training with an experienced
examiner with sufficient case work to afford testing in actual crime situations; (3) to
have had at least five years of independent experience as an examiner; and (4) to pro-
duce the polygraph test results in court. REID & INBAU 257.
39. 313 N.E.2d at 126.
40. Id. at 129.
41. The reasoning in Ridling has recently been rejected in United States v. Frogge,
476 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1973). Frogge was an unsuccessful appeal of a district
court conviction for assaulting federal marshals and attempted escape. Despite recogni-
tion of the emerging trend to allow evidentiary use of polygraph evidence, the court
found Ridling unpersuasive and denied admission of polygraph evidence.
42. An agreement to written stipulations has usually been limited to instances where
both parties had weak cases. See 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 101, 110 (1973); Note, supra
note 19, at 238. One commentator has warned that a stipulation may act as a waiver
of standards for examiner competence. Note, supra note 23, at 125.
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setts Supreme Judicial Court required only that the individual defendant
agree to its admission. After such agreement, only the defendant can move
to have a test administered; further, the examiner can be chosen only in care-
fully defined situations. 43 These requirements allow the defendant maximum
flexibility either to choose his own examiner or to have the Commonwealth
or the court select an examiner for him. Thus the lack of written stipulations
allows the defendant much greater latitude in the use of polygraph evidence
while the trial court can still maintain control over the quality of test
evidence.
In addition to rejecting written stipulations, the Juvenile (No. 1) court also
declined 'to require the special jury instructions which Justice Quirico, in
dissent, found necessary to offset the 'undue influence that polygraphic
evidence may have on a jury . . . . -44 Although Juvenile (No. 1) does not
directly address this problem of "trial by polygraph," 45 there is an inference
that a vigorous cross-examination can be relied upon to establish the proper
weight of polygraph evidence. The defendant's participation in cross-
examination, regardless of who chose the examiner,46 is intended to insure
the examiner's thoroughness in interpreting the test results. 47
IH. PROTECTION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Based upon its finding that polygraph tests are "essentially testimonial in
nature, ' 48 the Juvenile (No. 1) court imposed certain restrictions upon the
administering of the test which -would act to protect defendant's constitutional
rights. The decision required the trial judge to advise the defendant that
by submitting to the polygraph test he had "to that extent waived his Fifth
Amendment rights."'49 Additionally, the trial judge had to determine that
43. The four situations are when (1) the defendant moves to have an examination
administered by an expert of his choice; (2) the defendant moves to have an examina-
tion administered by an expert chosen by the Commonwealth; (3) the defendant moves
to have examination administered by an examiner or examiners jointly selected by the
Commonwealth and the defendant; and (4) the defendant moves to have an examination
administered by a court-appointed expert. 313 N.E.2d at 126.
44. Id. at 136.
45. The "trial by polygraph" argument has motivated the rejection of polygraph evi-
dence in some cases. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md.
1973); accord, People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430
(1969). Contra, United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 98 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
46. The right of cross-examination is, of course, dependent upon the party who called
the expert as a witness.
47. For an example of an effective cross-examination of a polygraph examiner, see
F. BAILEY, THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS 20-25 (1971).




the waiver was made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." 50
Although the true evidentiary nature of polygraph tests remains in dispute,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant cannot be com-
pelled to "provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature." 51 Therefore, it is apparent that the restrictions imposed by Juvenile
(No. 1) act to protect the defendant from being compelled to take a poly-
graph test on the Commonwealth's motion. In guaranteeing the defendant's
complete and voluntary cooperation in taking the test, the court further
insures the quality of polygraph evidence.
52
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding of Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1) does not make poly-
graph evidence generally admissible in Massachusetts criminal trials, but it
is more than a "cautious first step" 53 in that direction. By not requiring writ-
ten stipulations, corroborative testing or other severe restrictions, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court vests the trial judge with complete discretion
in ruling on the polygraph issue. The court's decision further provides the
defendant with considerable flexibility in his choice of prospective polygraph
examiners.
Despite the court's reservation of the right to limit this trend if the poly-
graph experiment proved to be a failure, it can be argued that with increased
use the polygraph will earn ready acceptance among the trial courts of Massa-
chusetts. The Juvenile (No. 1) court acknowledged the novelty and
complexity of the polygraph issue without concern for the lack of judicial
acceptance of polygraph evidence.
Stephen P. Murphy
50. Id., quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
51. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). The Schmerber Court also
stated, in dicta, that
[slome tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," for example, lie
detector tests measuring changes in body functions during interrogation, may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to deter-
mine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether
willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.
id. at 764.
52. Cf. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
53. 313 N.E.2d at 127.
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FAIR EMPLOYMENT-Aliens May Maintain a Cause of
Action for Private Employment Discrimination Under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498
F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
Despite widespread acceptance of the national goal of equal opportunity
in employment, the statutory basis for a claim alleging alienage discrimination
in private employment has remained uncertain. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19641 was enacted to eliminate discriminatory employment practices
which were based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.2 Because
the Act was aimed primarily at racial discrimination, most of the cases
brought under Title VII have involved black workers. Only recently has
Title VII been applied to remedy discrimination based on the other
prohibited classifications. Whether the proscription of employment discrimi-
nation based on national origin reaches discrimination based on alienage is
a question which has been the subject of very little litigation, 3 but one which
is now settled in view of the Supreme Court's recent holding that alienage
does not fall within the national origin category. 4 Nevertheless, section 1981
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act 5 may be emerging as a viable alternative for
attacking alienage discrimination in employment. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached this conclusion in Guerra v. Man-
chester Terminal Corp.,6 the first reported decision to address this question.
Plaintiff Guerra was a Mexican national registered in the United States
as a resident alien. From 1960 until 1967 he was employed by defendant
Manchester Terminal Corporation. Pursuant to contract negotiations be-
tween defendant and Local 1581, International Longshoremen's Association,
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) (originally enacted as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 253).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
3. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
4. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (originally enacted as An Act to protect all Persons
in the United States in their Civil Rights, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27). This section pro-
vides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
6. 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the corporation agreed to hire its employees through the union hiring hall.
Subsequently, the union membership voted approval of a plan under which
job placement in the corporation's dock and compress departments would be
made on the basis of the employee's citizenship. The rates of pay for all
of the job classifications in dock were higher than for any of the jobs in com-
press, and, under the union's plan, the jobs in dock were to go first to United
States citizens, then to citizens of Mexico whose families resided in the United
States, and finally to citizens of Mexico whose families had remained in
Mexico.
At the union's insistence, Guerra was transferred from the dock depart-
ment to a lower paying position in the compress department in September
1965. He was told that until he became a United States citizen or moved
his family to the United States he could not be employed in dock. Guerra
voluntarily left his job with Manchester in 1967 and brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in January
of 1971, 7 basing his claim of unlawful employment discrimination on both
Title VII and section 1981. The district court dismissed that part of plain-
tiff's claim based on Title VII8 but held that the suit was maintainable under
section 1981, 9 and the court of appeals affirmed.10
While several issues were presented in Guerra," the purpose of this note
7. In 1966 Guerra filed a sworn charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging that his transfer was unlawfully discriminatory under Ti-
tle VII. In August 1970, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that defendants
Local 1581 and Manchester had committed violations of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and
in December 1970, notified Guerra of his right to sue, pursuant to section 706(e) of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
Guerra had initiated proceedings along an alternative avenue of relief beginning in
October 1965, when he filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board. In May 1971, the Board issued a complaint alleging that Local 1581
had violated sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A), (b)(2) (1970), and, in May 1971, ordered defendant local
to desist from maintaining its discriminatory agreement with Manchester and to award
back pay to Guerra. The Fifth Circuit enforced that order, NLRB v. Longshoremen's
Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529, 533 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
9. Id. at 538.
10. 498 F.2d at 653-54.
11. The Fifth Circuit concluded that citizenship discrimination was encompassed by
section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A),
(b)(2) (1970). The court found that section 8 of the NLRA, like Title VII, partially
overlaps with § 1981 and was not intended to preempt or repeal that statute. 498 F.2d
at 650-51. See NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974);
Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971).
The court also found that, "[a] union's role as party to a collective bargaining agree-
ment can be legally sufficient to impose back pay liability on the union if the agreement
violates Title VII, Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1381 (5th
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is to explore the approach taken by the court in harmonizing two statutes,
both of which are applicable in cases of alleged employment discrimination,'12
and more generally, to investigate the impact of Guerra and section 1981
on the role of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
I. APPLICATION OF SECTION 1981 TO PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS
Neither the legislative history nor the judicial treatment of section 1981
clearly defines the nature of the protection offered and the scope of the class
protected by the statute. In Guerra, the court of appeals considered the
defendants' assertion that section 1981 is applicable only to racial discrimina-
tion and dismissed this argument summarily. 18 Finding that aliens are within
section 1981's coverage, the court indicated that since this issue had been
so widely litigated in the past 14 and the district court's analysis had been so
Cir. 1974). The rule applies with equal force in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970)." 498 F.2d at 655.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) sets forth the remedies available under Title VII:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice) ....
The same remedies have been found to exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The Fifth
Circuit recognized the availability of both back pay and injunctive relief in an employ-
ment discrimination suit brought under section 1981 in Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970). Other courts as well have found that private employ-
ment discrimination is prohibited by section 1981. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys-
tems, 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438
F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427
F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
13. The defendants premised their argument on the Supreme Court's decision in
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), in which the Court considered the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and found that "Congress intended to protect
a limited category of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality." Id. at 791.
Several courts have disallowed suits based on section 1981 that did not relate to racial
discrimination. See Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, 348 F. Supp.
51 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (section 1981 applies only to racial discrimination); Marshall v.
Plumbers Local 60, 343 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972) (section 1981 applies only to ra-
cial discrimination); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438
(N.D. Cal. 1972) (section 1981 does not extend to employment discrimination based
on sex); Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (section 1981 does not
extend to discrimination based on religion or national origin).
14. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). In Takahashi the Court invalidated a state stat-
ute forbidding the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citi-
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thorough and accurate, 15 it was unnecessary to give it more than cursory
attention.
The court found even less persuasive the defendants' argument that an
action based on section 1981 requires a showing of state action.' 6 In an
earlier opinion, Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,' 7 section 1981 had been
extended to private employment discrimination. The Fifth Circuit had
repeatedly affirmed Sanders,'8 so there seemed to be no compelling reason to
re-explore the issue. In addition, the district court had pointed out that since
the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.'0 it was well
settled that suits brought under section 1981 did not require state action.20
zenship. The Court found that the statute violated section 1981. After quoting the sec-
tion the Court said:
The protection of this section has been held to extend to aliens as well as citi-
zens. Consequently the section and the Fourteenth Amendment on which it
rests in part protect "all persons" against state legislation bearing unequally
upon them either because of alienage or color.
Id. at 419-20 (footnote omitted).
Referring to section 1981 the Court said in Graham: "The protection of this statute
has been held to extend to aliens as well as citizens." 403 U.S. at 377. See also Ro-
berto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
920 (1950); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1936).
15. 350 F. Supp. at 532-38. The inclusion of aliens within the protection of sec-
tion 1981 is based upon the reenactment of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
in the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144. Section 16 provided that
"all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States" shall have the rights set forth
in section 1 of the 1866 Act. The language of the 1870 Act was virtually the same
as that used in the 1866 Act. The 1866 Act had conferred rights only upon "all persons
born in the United States," whereas, as the district court noted, Senator Stewart, the
sponsor of the bill which included section 16, explained that the 1870 Act, which ex-
pressly mentions "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," would protect
aliens as well. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870), quoted in 350 F. Supp.
at 534. The Fifth Circuit adopted the district court's analysis in toto. 498 F.2d at 654.
16. For an analysis of section 1981 and the state action issue generally, see Larson,
The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private
Employment, 7 HARV. Civ. RlIGTs-Civ. LIn. L. REV. 56 (1972); Comment, Racial
Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
615 (1969).
17. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1378 (5th Cir. 1974); Belt
v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 458 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v. National
Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine
Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1971). The court appeared impa-
tient with the defendants' interposition of this issue, remarking, "[ift is very late in the
day for disgruntled defendants to be questioning such an unequivocal holding by this
Court." 498 F.2d at 654-55.
19. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
20. 350 F. Supp. at 538. While Jones was decided under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)
(prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of real property), it explicitly over-
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On this question also, the court of appeals adopted the district court's
analysis. 2 1
A. Confronting Precedent
Having disposed of the defendants' substantive challenges to the applica-
tion of section 1981 to private discrimination based on alienage, the court
turned its attention to the earlier legislative and judicial treatment of the
issues which Guerra had raised. In doing so it dealt squarely with prior case
law which denied a remedy to aliens on facts strikingly similar to those before
it.
In 1972, in an attempt to clarify the status of citizenship discrimination
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 22 the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [EEOC]23 issued a guideline stating that national
origin discrimination does include discrimination based on alienage.2 4 Not-
withstanding the Commission's pronouncement, the United States Supreme
Court held, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., that citizenship discrim-
ination was not included within Title VII's coverage.25
The Court maintained that the term "national origin" plainly referred to
the country where a person was born or the country from which one's ances-
tors came, 26 and that the legislative history of Title VII clearly precluded a
finding that national origin refers to a person's citizenship. 27 Furthermore,
ruled Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). Hodges was a section 1981 case
which held that a suit brought under that statute required state action. See 392 U.S. at
441-43 & n.78. See also Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.
1971) (racial discrimination in hiring); Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292
F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (racial discrimination in union hiring).
21. 498 F.2d at 654.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
23. The EEOC was created to effectuate Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to -5
(1970).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1972). "Because discrimination on the basis of citizen-
ship has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin, a lawfully immi-
grated alien who is domiciled or residing in this country may not be discriminated
against on the basis of his citizenship ....... Section 1606.1(d) was revised in 1974
to conform with the Espinoza decision. See 39 Fed. Reg. 10123 (1974).
25. 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973). Justice Douglas dissented in Espinoza, arguing that dis-
crimination on the basis of alienage is by definition national origin discrimination since
it favors persons born in the United States over those born elsewhere. Id. at 98.
26. Id. at 88.
27. Id. at 88-89. The Court maintained this position even in the face of its own
acknowledgement that the legislative history was "quite meager" and did not include any
references to alienage. Id. In his dissent Justice Douglas remarked: "Obviously 'na-
tional origin' comprehends 'ancestry' but . . . it means more-not only where one's for-
bears were born, but where one himself was born." Id. at 98 n.3.
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the federal government has discriminated against aliens for years in federal
employment. 28  The majority stated: "We cannot conclude Congress
would at once continue the practice of requiring citizenship as a condition
of federal employment and, at the same time, prevent private employers from
doing likewise." '29
Regarding the EEOC guideline, the Court acknowledged that it was
entitled to "great deference,"30 but disagreed with the notion that citizenship
discrimination was lantamount to national origin discrimination. 8' Because
more than 96% of the employees at defendant company's plant, including the
plantiff, were of Mexican ancestry, the Court reasoned that the defendants
did not discriminate against persons of Mexican national origin. It was not
unreasonable, then, to hold that the plaintiff had failed to prove any unlawful
activity which Title VII could remedy. 32
Unlike Espinoza, the claim in Guerra was based on both Title VII and
section 1981. As in Espinoza, -the Title VII claim was dismissed for failure
to demonstrate that plaintiff had suffered from discrimination based on his
national origin rather than on his status as an alien.33
II. APPLICATION OF THE TOLLING RULE
Having overcome the obstacle posed by Espinoza to a suit brought on the
basis of alienage discrimination, Guerra was still faced with defendants' argu-
ment that his suit was barred by the statute of limitations.3 4  It was held
in Guerra that the plaintiff's filing of a complaint with the EEOC, which in-
itiated Title VII proceedings, tolled the statute of limitations applicable to
his suit under section 1981.35 Prior to Guerra, this relationship between Title
VII, in which specific procedural requirements are clearly set out, and section
28. Id. at 89. Civil Service Commission regulations exclude aliens from competitive
civil service. 5 C.F.R. § 388.101(a) (1974).
29. 414 U.S. at 91.
30. Id. at 94.
31. The Court noted that in some situations a citizenship requirement might be part
of a wider scheme of national origin discrimination, and that Title VII prohibits citizen-
ship discrimination whenever its purpose or effect is to discriminate on the basis of na-
tional origin. Id. at 92.
32. Id. at 93.
33. 498 F.2d at 646-47. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Title VII would apply
to a situation in which an alien could prove that a policy of discrimination against aliens
was a guise for national origin discrimination. Id.
34. Id. at 647-48.
35. Id. at 648.
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1981, which is a general statement of congressional intent, was undefined. 6
Guerra did not bring suit until more than five years after his transfer
occurred. The district court found that because there was no statute of lim-
itations for section 1981, the Texas statute of limitations for claims not other-
wise provided for, 37 or for contract claims,38 both of which run for four
years, applied.39 Although this seemed to bar the claim, the court held that
the filing of a complaint with the EEOC in March 1966 tolled the running
of the statute for the claim based on section 1981.40 While the court of ap-
peals disagreed as to the applicable Texas statute of limitations, it upheld
the district court's finding that the statute was tolled by the filing of a com-
plaint with the EEOC.4I Thus, despite Title VII's unavailability to an alien
plaintiff following Espinoza, his attempt at invoking the procedural mechi-
36. The definitional section of Title VII exempts the federal government, certain
departments and agencies of the District of Columbia, and ptivate clubs from applica-
tion of its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1) (Supp. III 1973). However, a
1972 amendment provides coverage for employees of the exempted government agencies
by expanding the authority of the Civil Service Commission to deal with discrimination.
But, the protection afforded is more limited than that under other provisions of Title
VII. See Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111, amending
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (codified at, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-16 (Supp. III 1973)).
There are no such limitations under section 1981. Under Title VII, the aggrieved
party must file a formal charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged of-
fense occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (Supp. III 1973). In suits brought under
section 1981 the most applicable state statute of limitations governs. See Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 1974). See also
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1974); Boudreaux v.
Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.16 (5th Cir. 1971).
Section 1981 is not limited in applicability to employers of a minimum number of
persons as Title VII is. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-b (Supp. III 1973). Title VIII's remedial
provisions allow injunctive relief, reinstatement, and back pay liability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1973). Before filing a complaint with the EEOC, plaintiff must
first avail himself of the state remedies if any exist. 42 U.S.C. § 2COOe-5 (c) (Supp.
III 1973). Sixty days after the commencement of the proceedings, charges may be
filed with the EEOC. Id. The EEOC investigates discrimination complaints filed by
the aggrieved persons and attempts to remedy unlawful employment practices by
conciliation when it finds that probable cause exists to believe that there has been a
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (b) (Supp. III 1973). If attempts at
conciliation do not produce results, the aggrieved party is so informed and a civil suit
may be brought within thirty days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (Supp. III 1973).
37. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (1958).
38. Id. art. 5527.
39. 350 F. Supp. at 532. The statutes of limitations which the district court found
applicable each permit a four year period.
40. Id.
41. 498 F.2d at 648. Guerra's suit included an action for back pay. In Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), which was decided sub-
sequent to the oral argument of Guerra, the Fifth Circuit had held that section 1981
actions for back wages brought in federal court in Texas are to be governed by TEx.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1958), which permits recovery of back pay for only
a two year period. Thus, Guerra's claim would have been barred on September 7. 1967,
two years after his transfer from dock to compress, but Guerra's filing of a complaint
with the EEOC during 1966 (the exact date was in dispute but all parties agreed that
it was no l:ntpr thaln Ati-tict IOKA -- 1-1,A - I~ -... A . -t -.....-- .. .
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nisms of that statute permitted him to pursue his section 1981 claim. 42
The court noted that its application of the tolling rule rested on its recogni-
tion that Congress intended Title VII to be an important, but not the only
remedy for employment discrimination, and that Congress, in enacting Title
VII, had no intention of preempting or repealing section 1981. 43 The
application of the tolling rule, then, implemented Title VII's policy of en-
couraging settlement of grievances short of courtroom litigation through the
use of an administrative body, while preserving section 1981 intact. The
statutes are concurrently available; recourse to one does not preclude utiliza-
tion of the other, nor is one subordinate to the other. 44
The court asserted that the interests of defendants were not adversely af-
fected by extending the limitations period applicable to section 1981. When
the plaintiff has pursued his complaint in an alternative forum, such as the
EEOC, the defendant cannot complain of stale claims or lost evidence. Hav-
ing to defend in several forums may burden a defendant, but the court saw
this burden as the result of congressional action in creating multiple remedies
for the same discriminatory action and refused to lessen the burden at the
cost of jeopardizing the viability of one of those remedies. 45
The Fifth Circuit had held in prior decisions, and affirmed in Guerra, that
resort to Title VII is not a prerequisite to suit under section 1981.46 In this,
See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974); Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
42. Actually, Guerra's letter to the EEOC, coming in August 1966, or even if filed
as early as March 1966 as he claimed, was not a timely Title VII complaint. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970). The district court, however, held that Guerra's fling of an
unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board had tolled the
ninety day limitation on filing a charge with the EEOC. 350 F. Supp. at 532. The court
of appeals, on the other hand, held that the possible untimeliness of the EEOC charge in
this particular case was irrelevant to the tolling of the limitations period for the section
1981 claim. The rationale was that it would have been unfair to deprive Guerra of the
1981 remedy after the EEOC had accepted the complaint, though it was an "apparently
untimely" one, and "proceed[ed] with it as though nothing were amiss," thereby leading
Guerra reasonably to conclude that he could refrain from bringing court action until the
EEOC proceedings had ended, as the Fifth Circuit had decided earlier in Boudreaux and
Franks.
43. 498 F.2d at 650.
44. Id. at 651.
45. Id. at 652. The conclusion that the plaintiff's pursuit of remedies under Title
VII tolled the statute of limitations applicable to section 1981 did not quite end the
problem of limitations. The complaint filed with the EEOC did not name the defendant
Longshoremens' Local. The court found that charges brought before the EEOC had no
tolling effect in suits against a party not named in the complaint, absent a closer rela-
tionship between the parties than appeared on the record. id. at 652-53.
46. Id. at 650. See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 147 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1971); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. de.
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it is in conflict with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l. Harvester Co. 47  There, in attempting to reconcile the ap-
parent inconsistencies between Title VII and section 1981, the court held
that a plaintiff could avail himself of section 1981 only if he had first ex-
hausted his administrative remedies under Title VII, or could advance a
reasonable excuse for failure to do So. 48 The court found -that plaintiffs had
sufficiently justified their failure to employ Title VII procedures, and em-
phasized that they had indeed demonstrated that their failure to do so was
not unreasonable. 49
The Waters opinion framed the issue as whether Congress would have in-
tended to repeal section 1981 if it had been aware of that statute when enact-
ing Title VII, 50 and concluded that the legislative history of Title VII demon-
strated that Congress intended to preserve previously existing causes of
action. 51 Thus, as in Guerra, the Seventh Circuit opted for reconciling the
two statutes, though in Waters it was willing to limit the applicability of sec-
tion 1981 in order to implement the Congressional preference for conciliation
reflected in Title VII. 52
III. RAMIFICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Espinoza held that Title VII's prohibition against national origin discrim-
ination does not prevent a private employer from discriminating on the basis
of alienage. Aliens, however, are not always excluded from Title VII's
coverage. Title VII protects all persons from discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Espinoza Court emphasized
that if discrimination on the basis of alienage had as its purpose or effect
nied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437
F.2d 1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th
Cir. 1970).
47. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 485-87.
49. Id. at 487. The plaintiffs were permitted to bring suit under section 1981
against a labor union which had not been named in the complaint brought before the
EEOC. They pointed out that the amendment to the existing agreement between the
defendant corporation and the defendant local which they were attacking under section
1981 had been ratified only after they had filed their Title VII complaint, and that prior
to that ratification they had been unaware of the local's participation in the defendant
corporation's alleged discriminatory practices. The failure to follow Title VII proced-
ures was shown to have resulted from plaintiff's lack of information regarding defend-
ant's participation in the unlawful discrimination.
50. Id. at 485.
51. Id. The Court referred to Congress' rejection of an amendment by Senator
Tower to exclude agencies other than the EEOC from dealing with practices prohibited
by Title VII. Id.
52. Id. at 487.
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discrimination based on one of these prohibited classifications, Title VII's
remedies could be invoked. 53
The Espinoza Court did not recognize a Title VII claim when a majority
of the people employed by the defendant were of the same national origin as
the alien plaintiff. Thus, when it is impossible to demonstrate that an em-
ployer's action toward an alien is actually the manifestation of a policy of
discrimination on the basis of one of Title VII's prohibited classifications, the
alien plaintiff is without a remedy. 54  In effect, Espinoza permits alienage
discrimination unless it can be shown that the employer in question is using
alienage as a pretense, while systematically discriminating de facto on the
basis of national origin. In Guerra, a majority of the defendant's employees
were also of the same national origin as plaintiff, but because of the broader
scope of section 1981, the court was not constricted by Espinoza's narrow
construction of Title VII.
The decision in Espinoza that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 cannot be con-
strued as including discrimination against aliens perhaps represents a correct
construction of congressional intent. 5 This conclusion seems to militate
against the national interest in ensuring equal protection of the laws to all
persons. Nevertheless, the legislative history of Title VII is vague at best
with respect to its protection of aliens. However, the legislative history of
section 1981 shows that Congress specifically intended to include aliens with-
53. 414 U.S. at 92.
54. The Espinoza Court cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), as
authority for its discriminatory effects doctrine. 414 U.S. at 92. Griggs held that Title
VII prohibits de facto racial discrimination even when no unlawful discriminatory intent
can be attributed to the employer. Griggs was easily distinguishable from Espinoza in
that in the latter case, a pattern of de facto discrimination was virtually impossible to
prove in light of the district court's finding that 96% of the employees of the defendant
corporation were of the same national origin as Espinoza. The position of the EEOC,
on the other hand, was that the question of de facto discrimination, at least in the sense
in which the Espinoza majority had considered it, was irrelevant, for "discrimination
based on birth outside the United States . . . is . . . discrimination based on national
origin in violation of Title VII." Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co,, 414 U.S. 86 (1973). See Das, Discrimination in Employment Against
Aliens-The Impact of the Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Laws, 35 U. Pirr.
L. REV. 499, 543-46 (1974).
55. It is arguable that citizenship discrimination is prohibited by Title VII. An in-
troductory section to Title VII reads: "This subchapter shall not apply to an employer
with respect to the employment of aliens outside any state ....... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(1970). If this section is read conversely, it could be interpreted as meaning that Title
VII does reach the employment of aliens within the United States. This point was
raised by the district court in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 343 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D.
Tex. 1971), but the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt this reasoning. 462 F.2d at 1335.
In Guerra no mention was made of this.
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in the ambit of that statute.5" Thus, Guerra has significantly added to the
usefulness and desirability of bringing an employment discrimination action
under section 1981. The availability of section 1981 as an alternative, less
cumbersome means for remedying employment discrimination is invaluable.
In courts which accept the Guerra rationale the alien will be relieved of the
practically impossible burden of proving that an employer's refusal to hire or
promote him is grounded in a policy of national origin discrimination.
Elizabeth B. Wurzburg
56. See note 13 supra.
,[Vol. 24:376
